Building the Grid for India's Fastest-Growing Renewable Hubs
An asset stranded behind a congested grid earns no return, and a grid that oscillates is a risk to every consumer connected to it. The next 500 GW will not be constrained by sunlight, land or capital, but by wires, transformers and the industrial capacity to make them.
July 28, 2026. By News Bureau
India added close to 45 GW of renewable capacity in 2025 and reached 50 percent non fossil generation capacity five years ahead of its stated commitment. Yet beneath this achievement sits an uncomfortable engineering truth. Generation and transmission run on two different clocks. Solar parks are commissioned in 18 to 24 months, while the 765 kV corridors, HVDC links and pooling substations meant to evacuate that power take five to seven years from planning to energisation. The result is a structural lag of at least three to four years, and its consequences can no longer be treated as a footnote.
The problem is not renewable energy itself. It is concentration. Rajasthan hosts around 35 GW of solar capacity, roughly 27 percent of the national total, with over 85 percent of its pipeline packed into Barmer, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur. Gujarat is repeating the pattern at Khavda, where a single park is planned at 30 GW. When clusters of 4 to 8 GW of inverter-based generation are funnelled into a handful of extra high voltage nodes, the electrical character of the grid changes. Short circuit ratios at pooling stations fall, fault behaviour becomes unfamiliar, and inverter control loops begin to interact with one another and with dynamic compensation equipment in ways planning studies never anticipated. Rotating inertia is being displaced by power electronics, and in a weak grid pocket the electronics can quarrel.
The record of published grid events makes the point with uncomfortable clarity. From mid December 2022 through November 2024, the Bhadla, Fatehgarh and Bikaner complex experienced repeated voltage oscillations, with 400 kV bus voltages swinging between 380 kV and 420 kV, some events escalating into generation loss of the order of 7 GW along with line tripping. In one documented disturbance, plants responded to a voltage dip by abruptly curtailing output, creating overvoltage at adjacent substations and tripping every 765 kV line emanating from Fatehgarh 2. Between January 2022 and July 2025, the grid recorded 68 events in which more than 1 GW of renewable generation was lost in a single incident, traced to ride through failures, protection settings and phase locked loop instability under weak grid conditions.
The pattern has continued into 2026. On 14 January, nine extra high voltage lines in Rajasthan tripped within 30 minutes amid overvoltage conditions. On 11 May, GRID India flagged a sustained oscillation event across seven projects totalling 3,168 MW, during which the 400 kV bus voltage at Bhadla varied between 373 kV and 440 kV within minutes. An investigation committee has separately identified fifteen plants contributing to oscillations amplified by static compensators at Bhadla 2 and Fatehgarh 2. The commercial toll runs in parallel. Nearly 4 GW of wind and solar has faced curtailment in Rajasthan since March 2025, some plants losing up to 80 percent of output during peak sun hours, while around 60 GW of projects await transmission connectivity that the Central Transmission Utility has acknowledged it cannot presently provide.
Part of the lag is intrinsic. Right of way acquisition, clearances and the civil scale of a 765 kV double circuit corridor cannot be compressed to solar park timelines. But a substantial part is manufactured by our own procurement model. Every transformer, reactor, instrument transformer and switchgear bay is bought through discrete competitive tenders awarded project by project, so a manufacturer of high voltage equipment sees demand only one tender at a time. Global lead times for large power transformers have stretched to three or four years, and no rational manufacturer commits hundreds of crores to new capacity on the strength of a tender it may or may not win. The industry is being asked to guess the next order, and capacity built on guesswork arrives late.
Europe has confronted the same arithmetic and chosen a different instrument. Transmission system operators such as TenneT and Amprion have moved from transactional tenders to multi-year framework and capacity reservation agreements with equipment manufacturers. TenneT anchored its 2 GW HVDC programme in framework agreements of roughly 30 billion euro spanning a decade of standardised converter stations, transformers and switchgear. Amprion signed a capacity reservation agreement in 2023 under which its converter station supplier could reserve and expand manufacturing resources and workforce ahead of firm orders, followed by cable frameworks of 5 billion euro covering 4,400 km of high voltage cable. The logic is powerful. When the grid operator underwrites demand visibility for a decade, the manufacturer invests in factories, test laboratories and skilled people today, and delivery schedules stop being the binding constraint on the transition.
India needs an equivalent instrument. The Central Transmission Utility, POWERGRID and state utilities should be empowered to sign multi-year capacity reservation and framework agreements with domestic manufacturers of transformers, reactors, instrument transformers, insulators and substation equipment, built on standardised designs, indexed pricing and committed offtake bands. This is not a dilution of competition. Frameworks can be competitively awarded and periodically rebid. What changes is that competition happens once for a decade of visibility rather than annually for a single package, and that visibility is.
An asset stranded behind a congested grid earns no return, and a grid that oscillates is a risk to every consumer connected to it. The next 500 GW will not be constrained by sunlight, land or capital, but by wires, transformers and the industrial capacity to make them. Procurement reform of the kind Europe has already operationalised is the cheapest transmission investment India can make, because it requires no land, no clearance and no right of way. It requires only the willingness to buy the future the way we intend to build it.
The problem is not renewable energy itself. It is concentration. Rajasthan hosts around 35 GW of solar capacity, roughly 27 percent of the national total, with over 85 percent of its pipeline packed into Barmer, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur. Gujarat is repeating the pattern at Khavda, where a single park is planned at 30 GW. When clusters of 4 to 8 GW of inverter-based generation are funnelled into a handful of extra high voltage nodes, the electrical character of the grid changes. Short circuit ratios at pooling stations fall, fault behaviour becomes unfamiliar, and inverter control loops begin to interact with one another and with dynamic compensation equipment in ways planning studies never anticipated. Rotating inertia is being displaced by power electronics, and in a weak grid pocket the electronics can quarrel.
The record of published grid events makes the point with uncomfortable clarity. From mid December 2022 through November 2024, the Bhadla, Fatehgarh and Bikaner complex experienced repeated voltage oscillations, with 400 kV bus voltages swinging between 380 kV and 420 kV, some events escalating into generation loss of the order of 7 GW along with line tripping. In one documented disturbance, plants responded to a voltage dip by abruptly curtailing output, creating overvoltage at adjacent substations and tripping every 765 kV line emanating from Fatehgarh 2. Between January 2022 and July 2025, the grid recorded 68 events in which more than 1 GW of renewable generation was lost in a single incident, traced to ride through failures, protection settings and phase locked loop instability under weak grid conditions.
The pattern has continued into 2026. On 14 January, nine extra high voltage lines in Rajasthan tripped within 30 minutes amid overvoltage conditions. On 11 May, GRID India flagged a sustained oscillation event across seven projects totalling 3,168 MW, during which the 400 kV bus voltage at Bhadla varied between 373 kV and 440 kV within minutes. An investigation committee has separately identified fifteen plants contributing to oscillations amplified by static compensators at Bhadla 2 and Fatehgarh 2. The commercial toll runs in parallel. Nearly 4 GW of wind and solar has faced curtailment in Rajasthan since March 2025, some plants losing up to 80 percent of output during peak sun hours, while around 60 GW of projects await transmission connectivity that the Central Transmission Utility has acknowledged it cannot presently provide.
Part of the lag is intrinsic. Right of way acquisition, clearances and the civil scale of a 765 kV double circuit corridor cannot be compressed to solar park timelines. But a substantial part is manufactured by our own procurement model. Every transformer, reactor, instrument transformer and switchgear bay is bought through discrete competitive tenders awarded project by project, so a manufacturer of high voltage equipment sees demand only one tender at a time. Global lead times for large power transformers have stretched to three or four years, and no rational manufacturer commits hundreds of crores to new capacity on the strength of a tender it may or may not win. The industry is being asked to guess the next order, and capacity built on guesswork arrives late.
Europe has confronted the same arithmetic and chosen a different instrument. Transmission system operators such as TenneT and Amprion have moved from transactional tenders to multi-year framework and capacity reservation agreements with equipment manufacturers. TenneT anchored its 2 GW HVDC programme in framework agreements of roughly 30 billion euro spanning a decade of standardised converter stations, transformers and switchgear. Amprion signed a capacity reservation agreement in 2023 under which its converter station supplier could reserve and expand manufacturing resources and workforce ahead of firm orders, followed by cable frameworks of 5 billion euro covering 4,400 km of high voltage cable. The logic is powerful. When the grid operator underwrites demand visibility for a decade, the manufacturer invests in factories, test laboratories and skilled people today, and delivery schedules stop being the binding constraint on the transition.
India needs an equivalent instrument. The Central Transmission Utility, POWERGRID and state utilities should be empowered to sign multi-year capacity reservation and framework agreements with domestic manufacturers of transformers, reactors, instrument transformers, insulators and substation equipment, built on standardised designs, indexed pricing and committed offtake bands. This is not a dilution of competition. Frameworks can be competitively awarded and periodically rebid. What changes is that competition happens once for a decade of visibility rather than annually for a single package, and that visibility is.
An asset stranded behind a congested grid earns no return, and a grid that oscillates is a risk to every consumer connected to it. The next 500 GW will not be constrained by sunlight, land or capital, but by wires, transformers and the industrial capacity to make them. Procurement reform of the kind Europe has already operationalised is the cheapest transmission investment India can make, because it requires no land, no clearance and no right of way. It requires only the willingness to buy the future the way we intend to build it.
- Bharanidharan Pandyan, Joint Managing Director, Quality Power Electrical Equipments
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